财产权不是垄断的挡箭牌

——评行动党与51位商界领袖的反拆分公开信

本周，51位新西兰商界领袖联署公开信，呼吁政党“尊重私有财产和契约自由”。行动党党魁David Seymour立刻接棒，宣称“历史数据显示，超市合并并没有导致价格上涨”，并明确反对强制拆分超市。听起来很庄严，但仔细一看，这封信和这套论证，是在用市场经济的语言，给寡头结构打保护伞。

第一，财产权和契约自由不是绝对权利，竞争法本身就是对契约自由的合法限制。

禁止卡特尔、禁止滥用市场支配地位、并购审查、强制批发准入，哪一项不是对“契约自由”的干预？如果合法经营就可以免于竞争监管，那Commerce Act可以扔进垃圾桶，商务委员会可以关门。依法拆分并给予补偿，不是“没收”，不是“攻击合法企业”，而是市场经济自我纠错的常规工具。标准石油被拆过，AT&T被拆过。真正的问题从来不是“能不能干预”，而是“是否有法律依据、独立评估、补偿和过渡期”。

第二，Seymour用国际食品价格同步来证明“合并无害”，是典型的偷换概念。

他说，自1990年代初以来，新西兰食品价格走势与澳大利亚、OECD平均一致，所以超市合并没有导致价格上涨。可是，食品价格受汇率、能源、气候、运费、全球大宗商品影响，跨国同步再正常不过。更关键的是，澳大利亚超市同样由Coles和Woolworths双寡头主导。新西兰和澳大利亚走势一致，可能说明两国都竞争不足，而不是竞争充分。

要证明合并无害，得看市场份额、毛利率、EBIT利润率、供应商付款期限、区域竞争程度、新进入者壁垒，而不是只看一条总体CPI曲线。总体食品通胀是粗糙指标，它掩盖了品类价格、促销策略、供应商被压价和区域价差。用一条国际曲线给双寡头开脱，不是实证研究，是政治辩护。

第三，2022年商务委员会的食品杂货市场研究已经给出答案：竞争没有为消费者良好运作。

新西兰食品杂货市场长期由Foodstuffs和Woolworths NZ主导，合计份额约八成。商务委员会不是激进左翼，它是法定独立监管机构。它认定竞争不充分，并建议行为守则、批发准入、规划改革、禁止限制性土地契约等措施。它没有建议强制拆分，但它彻底否定了“竞争充分”的神话。行动党说拆分理由“极其薄弱”，可真正薄弱的是对官方市场研究的视而不见。

第四，“减少监管、吸引新投资者”不能替代竞争执法。

行动党说，解决办法是减少监管障碍，让新竞争者进入。问题是，新进入者面对的不只是审批：还有批发供应锁定、物流网络、品牌认知、土地契约排他、规模经济、供应商返利。仅靠减少监管，未必能打破双寡头。更有效的组合是：强制主要超市向新进入者批发供应，实施行为守则和杂货专员，禁止限制性土地契约，改革规划降低开店难度，提高价格和供应商条款透明度，必要时才考虑结构性拆分。把“减少监管”和“强制拆分”对立起来，是假二分法。

第五，51位CEO和董事联署，是利益表达，不是中立证据。

这51人来自各行各业，但多为大企业领袖，本身可能是现有市场结构的受益者。他们的公开信是政治游说，不是实证研究。签名数量不能代替数据。尊重投资信心很重要，但把垄断租金说成投资信心的前提，站不住脚。真正损害投资信心的是任意、追溯、不可预期的政策，而不是依法、透明、有过渡期的竞争改革。

Seymour说，拆分节省很小，通胀会抵消。这是把名义价格和实际价格混为一谈。如果通胀5%，不拆分涨5%，拆分后涨4%，消费者实际仍受益。长期每年1%—2%的实际价格改善，复利下来并不小。更重要的是，反垄断干预的目标不只是短期降价，还包括恢复竞争、压制市场势力、改善供应商公平、推动创新和生产率。不能用短期通胀否定长期结构改革。

新西兰人正在为双寡头付账。政党如果真关心生活成本，就请拿出勇气，支持依法、透明、有补偿、有过渡期的结构性拆分，并同步推进批发准入、行为守则、规划改革和禁止限制性土地契约。不要被51个签名吓倒，更不要被“财产权”三个字绑架。

合法经营不等于免于竞争监管。国际价格同步不等于竞争充分。CEO联署不等于中立研究。行动党把这三件事混在一起，不是捍卫市场经济，而是捍卫垄断租金。

新西兰需要的不是更温顺的监管者，而是更竞争的市场。谁害怕竞争，谁就不配谈生活成本。

（文：欧柏）

Opinion

Property Rights Are Not a Shield for Monopoly

New Zealand’s supermarket duopoly is hiding behind a familiar mantra.

This week, 51 New Zealand business leaders signed an open letter urging political parties to “respect private property and freedom of contract.” David Seymour, the leader of the ACT Party, quickly picked up the baton, declaring that “historical data show supermarket mergers have not led to price increases” and flatly opposing forced divestiture of supermarkets. It sounds high-minded. But look closely, and the letter and its argument are using the language of the free market to shelter an oligopoly.

First, property rights and freedom of contract are not absolute. Competition law is itself a legitimate limit on freedom of contract.

Banning cartels, prohibiting the abuse of market dominance, reviewing mergers, requiring wholesale access—which of these is not an intervention in “freedom of contract”? If lawful operation exempted a company from competition oversight, the Commerce Act could be tossed in the bin and the Commerce Commission shut down. Divestiture carried out under law and with compensation is not “confiscation.” It is not an “attack on lawful businesses.” It is a routine tool by which a market economy corrects itself. Standard Oil was broken up. AT&T was broken up. The real question has never been whether intervention is possible, but whether it has a legal basis, independent assessment, compensation and a transition period.

Second, Seymour uses international food-price synchronization to prove that mergers are harmless. That is a classic bait and switch.

He says that since the early 1990s, New Zealand food prices have broadly tracked Australia and the OECD average, so supermarket mergers did not cause price increases. But food prices are driven by exchange rates, energy, climate, shipping and global commodities. Cross-country synchronization is normal. More important, Australian supermarkets are also dominated by a Coles-Woolworths duopoly. If New Zealand and Australia move together, that may show both markets are insufficiently competitive, not that competition is healthy.

To prove mergers are harmless, you need to look at market share, gross margins, EBIT margins, supplier payment terms, regional competition and barriers to entry—not a single aggregate CPI line. Overall food inflation is a crude measure. It masks category prices, promotional tactics, supplier squeeze and regional price gaps. Using one international curve to exonerate a duopoly is not empirical research. It is political advocacy.

Third, the Commerce Commission’s 2022 grocery market study already gave the answer: competition is not working well for consumers.

New Zealand’s grocery market has long been dominated by Foodstuffs and Woolworths NZ, which together hold roughly 80 percent. The Commerce Commission is not a radical left-wing body. It is an independent statutory regulator. It found competition inadequate and recommended a code of conduct, wholesale access, planning reform and a ban on restrictive land covenants. It did not recommend forced divestiture, but it demolished the myth of robust competition. ACT says the case for divestiture is “extremely thin.” What is actually thin is its willingness to engage with the official market study.

Fourth, “reduce regulation and attract new investors” cannot replace competition enforcement.

ACT says the solution is to reduce regulatory barriers and let new competitors enter. The problem is that new entrants face more than permits: wholesale supply lock-in, logistics networks, brand recognition, exclusive land covenants, economies of scale and supplier rebates. Reducing regulation alone may not break a duopoly. A more effective mix is to require major supermarkets to supply new entrants at wholesale, impose a code of conduct and a Grocery Commissioner, ban restrictive land covenants, reform planning to make opening stores easier, increase transparency in prices and supplier terms, and consider structural divestiture only when necessary. Setting “less regulation” against “forced divestiture” is a false binary.

Fifth, the signatures of 51 CEOs and directors are interest-group advocacy, not neutral evidence.

These 51 people come from various industries, but many are big-business leaders who may themselves benefit from the existing market structure. Their open letter is political lobbying, not empirical research. The number of signatures cannot substitute for data. Investor confidence matters, but it does not follow that monopoly rents are its precondition. What really damages investor confidence is arbitrary, retrospective and unpredictable policy—not competition reform carried out under law, transparently and with transition periods.

Seymour says divestiture savings would be small and inflation would wipe them out. That confuses nominal and real prices. If inflation is 5 percent, prices rise 5 percent without divestiture and 4 percent with it; consumers still gain in real terms. A real price improvement of 1 to 2 percent a year compounds and is not trivial. More important, antitrust intervention is not only about short-term price cuts. It is about restoring competition, constraining market power, improving fairness for suppliers and driving innovation and productivity. Short-term inflation cannot be used to veto long-term structural reform.

New Zealanders are paying the bill for a duopoly. If political parties genuinely care about the cost of living, they should find the courage to support lawful, transparent, compensated and phased structural divestiture, alongside wholesale access, a code of conduct, planning reform and a ban on restrictive land covenants. Do not be intimidated by 51 signatures. Do not be held hostage by the phrase “property rights.”

Lawful operation does not mean exemption from competition oversight. International price synchronization does not mean robust competition. CEO signatures do not mean neutral research. ACT has conflated these three things. It is not defending the market economy. It is defending monopoly rents.

New Zealand does not need a more docile regulator. It needs a more competitive market. Those who fear competition have no business lecturing the country about the cost of living.