——房地产清盘潮背后，联合政府不能只解释过去，更必须回答它改变了什么

在新西兰，房地产从来不只是房子。

它连接着银行、建筑商、材料供应商、工程师、律师、房地产中介以及无数中小企业。开发商不拿地，建筑商就没有订单；项目停工，供应商就收不到钱；企业减少招聘，家庭收入和消费也会受到影响。

所以，当房地产企业成批倒下时，受到冲击的从来不只是房地产行业。

新西兰破产与受托服务局数据显示，公司清盘数量从2022/23财年的251宗，上升到2023/24年的381宗、2024/25年的586宗，并在2025/26财年达到681宗。三年间增加约171%。

Companies Office的数据同样令人警惕。2026年第一季度有669宗清算人任命，比2025年同期增加8.1%，比2024年同期高出33.3%；2025年第四季度甚至达到889宗。

这些数字背后，是一家家企业耗尽现金、失去融资、最终退出市场。

而企业清盘通常只是危机的最后一步。

一家开发商今天进入清盘，可能意味着它两年前就已经卖不动房子，一年前就开始承受沉重的利息成本，几个月前已经无法获得新的融资。

因此，今天看到的倒闭潮，是过去几年房地产周期积累风险后的集中释放。

这也是为什么，不能简单地说“国家党上台以后，房地产企业才开始倒闭”。

疫情期间的超低利率推动了房地产价格和土地价格上涨；随后全球通胀和央行加息，又迅速改变了游戏规则。开发商同时面对昂贵的土地、昂贵的建筑成本和昂贵的资金。

当房屋销售放缓，成本却没有同步下降，很多开发项目原本看起来不错的利润空间便迅速消失。

这些问题并不是2023年11月由国家党创造的。

但是，这并不能成为联合政府今天免责的理由。

因为到2026年，新西兰人面对的已经不是一个刚刚上台几个月的新政府，而是一个已经执政近三年的政府。

这意味着，问题已经从“谁制造了危机”，逐渐转变成了一个更加直接的政治问题：

联合政府上台以后，究竟改变了什么？

如果高利率是问题，利率最终下降以后，为什么企业压力仍然如此严重？

如果建筑成本是问题，政府采取的改革是否真正降低了开发成本？

如果住房供应是问题，为什么大量开发项目仍然无法启动？

如果企业信心是问题，为什么清盘数量仍然处于高位？

如果经济增长是政府的核心目标，那么这些企业倒闭和投资疲软的数据，政府准备如何解释？

这些问题不能永远用“上一届政府留下的烂摊子”来回答。

上一届政府当然应该为过去的政策承担责任。

但新政府同样必须为自己的任期承担责任。

这正是民主政治中最基本的逻辑：你可以继承问题，但不能无限期继承免责权。

房地产最怕的其实不是房价下跌，而是不确定性。

一个开发项目需要几年才能完成。开发商今天买下一块土地，面对的是几年后的市场；银行今天提供贷款，也必须相信几年后的现金流。

如果企业不知道未来的融资成本、建筑成本、住房需求和政策环境会是什么样，那么最理性的商业决定往往不是投资，而是等待。

而当整个行业都在等待，经济就会失去动力。

投资减少，建设减少，就业减少，收入增长放缓，消费下降，企业利润进一步受到挤压，于是更多企业选择不投资。

这才是房地产危机真正危险的地方。

它可能从资产市场的问题，逐渐变成经济信心的问题。

而在这里，政府的责任就不能再回避。

政府当然不能控制所有经济变量。它不能决定全球利率，也不能决定国际建筑材料价格，更不能阻止全球经济周期。

但政府能够决定监管环境、税收政策、基础设施投资、住房政策以及大量影响企业成本和投资预期的制度安排。

政府也可以通过政策向市场发出信号：这里值得投资，还是应该继续观望。

因此，评价一个政府是否处理好房地产危机，不能只看它有没有宣布新的政策，也不能只看部长们在新闻发布会上说了什么。

最终要看结果。

开发商有没有重新拿地？

建筑企业有没有重新招聘？

银行有没有恢复对中小企业的融资？

住宅项目有没有重新开工？

私人资本有没有重新进入？

企业清盘数量有没有开始持续下降？

如果这些问题的答案仍然令人失望，那么政府就必须接受一个不太舒服的事实：

政策的宣布不等于经济的复苏。

这也是2026年大选前，新西兰房地产问题最值得追问的地方。

政治人物很容易争论“谁造成了上一轮房地产泡沫”，也很容易把今天的问题归咎于过去。

但对于已经倒闭的企业来说，这些争论没有意义。

对于失去工作的建筑工人来说，没有意义。

对于拿不到贷款的年轻家庭来说，也没有意义。

他们需要的是一个能够重新运转的经济。

过去几年，新西兰人最关心的问题是：“房价什么时候上涨？”

现在更应该问的是：

“新西兰什么时候重新成为一个值得投资的经济体？”

这两者并不是一回事。

一个国家可以因为住房供应不足而出现房价上涨，却依然拥有一个缺乏生产力、投资和信心的经济。

真正健康的房地产市场，需要开发商愿意建设、银行愿意融资、家庭有能力购买，同时企业相信未来存在足够的需求。

如果这些条件没有恢复，房价即使上涨，也可能只是下一轮资产泡沫的开始。

对于一个人口规模有限、经济高度依赖国际贸易和资本流动的小型开放经济体而言，这尤其危险。

资本不会因为新西兰“需要投资”就自动留下。

投资者会比较回报、风险、税收、监管、融资成本以及未来增长空间。如果其他国家能够提供更好的回报和更低的不确定性，资本就会离开。

这才是新西兰真正需要面对的竞争。

因此，2026年大选的房地产辩论如果再次停留在“谁造成了危机”，其实是在回避更重要的问题。

国家党可以指出前任政府留下的问题；工党可以批评现政府的政策。

但作为现任政府，国家党领导的联合政府最终必须回答的，是它自己的成绩单。

执政近三年之后，企业为什么还在大量清盘？

为什么私人投资没有明显恢复？

为什么建筑业仍然承受压力？

为什么大量开发商仍然选择观望？

更重要的是，如果这些趋势继续下去，政府准备承担怎样的政治责任？

这些不是反对党为了制造新闻而提出的问题。

这是任何一个希望继续执政的政府都必须面对的问题。

新西兰真正需要的，不是下一轮房地产价格疯狂上涨。

那样的繁荣已经经历过一次，代价同样十分昂贵。

新西兰需要的是一个更健康的经济循环：资本愿意进入，企业愿意投资，开发商愿意建设，建筑工人能够就业，家庭收入能够增长，年轻人能够看到留下来的希望。

如果这个循环能够重新建立，房地产市场自然会恢复活力。

如果不能，那么今天倒下的房地产企业，很可能只是更大经济问题浮出水面的第一批信号。

所以，2026年大选前，真正值得新西兰人追问的，已经不是谁应该为上一轮房地产危机负责，而是一个更现实的问题：

经过近三年的执政，国家党领导的联合政府，究竟有没有让新西兰重新成为一个值得投资的经济体？

房地产企业一家倒闭，可以是商业失败；数百家企业相继倒下，就不能只被解释为市场周期。

政府当然无法控制全球利率、国际价格和经济周期，但它必须为自己能够改变的事情负责：投资环境、监管成本、住房政策、基础设施以及企业信心。

这就是2026年大选真正的责任账单。

你可以继承问题，但不能无限期继承免责权。

选民最终不会只听政府解释问题来自哪里，而会看一个更简单的结果：企业有没有重新投资，建筑业有没有重新活跃，工作机会有没有增加，年轻人有没有看到未来。

如果答案仍然是否定的，那么“这是前任政府留下的问题”，就不再是解释，而会变成现任政府必须面对的政治责任。

When Property Companies Start Falling: Can New Zealand Become an Economy Worth Investing In Again?

— Behind the wave of property liquidations, the coalition government must do more than explain the past. It must answer what it has changed.

In New Zealand, property has never been just about houses.

It sits at the centre of a much wider economic ecosystem, linking banks, builders, suppliers, engineers, lawyers, real-estate agents and thousands of small and medium-sized businesses. When developers stop buying land, builders lose contracts. When projects stall, suppliers go unpaid. When businesses stop hiring, household incomes and consumer spending suffer.

So when property companies begin to fail in significant numbers, the damage extends well beyond the property sector itself.

Figures from New Zealand’s Insolvency and Trustee Service show company liquidations rising from 251 in the 2022/23 financial year to 381 in 2023/24, 586 in 2024/25 and 681 in 2025/26 — an increase of about 171 per cent in three years.

The Companies Office tells a similarly troubling story. There were 669 liquidator appointments in the first quarter of 2026, up 8.1 per cent from the same quarter a year earlier and 33.3 per cent above the level recorded in the first quarter of 2024. The final quarter of 2025 saw the figure reach 889.

Behind those numbers are businesses running out of cash, losing access to finance and eventually leaving the market.

And liquidation is usually the final stage of a much longer crisis.

A developer entering liquidation today may have stopped selling properties two years ago, begun struggling with heavy interest costs a year ago and lost access to new financing only months before its collapse.

What we are seeing now is therefore not a sudden event, but the delayed release of risks accumulated over several years of the property cycle.

That is why it would be too simplistic to argue that property companies began failing simply because the National-led government came to power.

Ultra-low interest rates during the pandemic pushed up property and land prices. Then inflation and higher interest rates abruptly changed the economics of development. Developers found themselves squeezed by the combined cost of expensive land, expensive construction and expensive finance.

As housing sales slowed while costs remained stubbornly high, profit margins that had once looked comfortable disappeared rapidly.

These problems were not created by National in November 2023.

But that does not give the coalition government a permanent exemption from responsibility.

By 2026, New Zealanders are no longer dealing with a government that has been in office for a few months. The coalition has been in power for almost three years.

The question has therefore shifted from who created the crisis to something much more immediate:

What has the coalition government actually changed?

If high interest rates were the problem, why does pressure on businesses remain so severe even after rates have fallen?

If construction costs were the problem, have the government’s reforms genuinely reduced the cost of development?

If housing supply is the problem, why are so many developments still failing to get off the ground?

If business confidence is the problem, why do liquidations remain so elevated?

And if economic growth is a central government objective, how does it account for continued business failures and weak private investment?

These questions cannot be answered indefinitely by pointing to the mess inherited from the previous government.

The previous government should certainly be held accountable for its policies.

But the current government must also be held accountable for its own record.

That is the basic logic of democratic government:

You can inherit a problem. You cannot inherit an indefinite exemption from responsibility.

For property, the greatest danger is not necessarily falling prices. It is uncertainty.

A development can take years to complete. When a developer buys land today, it is making a bet on the market several years from now. When a bank provides finance, it too must believe in the viability of future cash flows.

If businesses cannot predict the cost of finance, construction, housing demand or the policy environment, the most rational commercial decision may not be to invest at all. It may simply be to wait.

And when an entire industry waits, the wider economy loses momentum.

Investment falls. Construction slows. Employment weakens. Income growth loses pace. Consumer spending softens. Corporate profits come under further pressure. More businesses then decide to postpone investment.

That is what makes a property downturn particularly dangerous.

A problem that begins in the asset market can gradually become a crisis of economic confidence.

And this is where the government’s responsibility can no longer be avoided.

Governments cannot control every economic variable. They cannot set global interest rates, determine international construction-material prices or prevent the global economic cycle from turning.

But they can shape the regulatory environment, taxation, infrastructure investment, housing policy and many of the institutional settings that determine business costs and investment expectations.

Government policy also sends a signal to the market: is this a country worth investing in, or one in which it is safer to remain on the sidelines?

That means judging a government’s handling of the property downturn cannot be reduced to counting new policy announcements or listening to what ministers say at press conferences.

Ultimately, the test is the result.

Are developers buying land again?

Are construction companies hiring again?

Are banks willing to lend to small and medium-sized businesses again?

Are housing projects restarting?

Is private capital returning?

Are company liquidations beginning to fall consistently?

If the answers remain disappointing, the government must confront an uncomfortable truth:

Announcing policy is not the same as delivering an economic recovery.

That is also where the property debate ahead of the 2026 election should begin.

Politicians can spend endless time arguing over who created the previous housing bubble. They can just as easily blame today’s difficulties on decisions made years ago.

But for a business that has already collapsed, those arguments mean little.

They mean little to a construction worker who has lost his job.

They mean little to a young family unable to secure finance.

What they need is an economy that works again.

For years, the dominant question in New Zealand was: When will house prices rise again?

The more important question now is:

When will New Zealand become an economy worth investing in again?

Those are not the same thing.

A country can experience rising house prices because housing supply is constrained and still have an economy suffering from weak productivity, investment and confidence.

A genuinely healthy property market requires developers willing to build, banks willing to finance, households able to buy, and businesses confident that sufficient demand will exist in the future.

Without those conditions, rising house prices may simply mark the beginning of another asset bubble.

For a small, open economy heavily dependent on international trade and capital flows, that is particularly risky.

Capital does not remain in New Zealand simply because the country needs investment.

Investors compare returns, risks, taxes, regulation, financing costs and future growth prospects. If other countries offer better returns with less uncertainty, capital will go elsewhere.

That is the competition New Zealand ultimately has to confront.

So if the property debate during the 2026 election once again becomes an argument over who caused the crisis, it will miss the more important question.

National can point to the problems inherited from the previous government. Labour can attack the policies of the current government.

But as the party leading the government, National and its coalition partners must ultimately answer for their own record.

After almost three years in office, why are businesses still entering liquidation in such numbers?

Why has private investment not recovered more convincingly?

Why is the construction industry still under pressure?

Why are so many developers still waiting on the sidelines?

And, more importantly, if these trends continue, what political responsibility is the government prepared to accept?

These are not questions manufactured by the opposition for political theatre.

They are questions every government seeking another term must answer.

The failure of one property company can be dismissed as a business failure.

When hundreds fail, it becomes a warning about the economic environment.

That does not prove the coalition government created the crisis.

But neither does it prove that the coalition government has solved it.

There is a profound political difference between those two propositions.

A government can inherit economic problems. It cannot indefinitely explain its own record as merely the legacy of its predecessor.

The responsibility of government is not simply to explain why the past happened. It is to demonstrate that the future can be made better.

New Zealand does not need another speculative property boom.

It has already experienced one, and the cost was substantial.

What it needs is a healthier economic cycle: capital willing to enter, businesses willing to invest, developers willing to build, construction workers in work, household incomes rising, and young people able to see a future here.

If that cycle can be restored, the property market will recover with it.

If it cannot, the property companies failing today may prove to be among the earliest signals of a much deeper economic problem.

So, ahead of the 2026 election, the question New Zealanders should be asking is no longer simply who was responsible for the last property crisis.

It is this:

After almost three years in office, has the National-led coalition government made New Zealand an economy worth investing in again?

A property company going under may be a commercial failure. Hundreds going under cannot simply be dismissed as another turn of the economic cycle.

The government cannot control global interest rates, international prices or the business cycle. But it must be accountable for the things it can influence: the investment environment, regulatory costs, housing policy, infrastructure and business confidence.

That is the real accountability test of the 2026 election.

A government may inherit a problem. It cannot inherit an indefinite exemption from responsibility.

Voters will ultimately judge the government not by where it says the problem came from, but by whether businesses are investing again, construction is recovering, jobs are being created and young New Zealanders can still see a future here.

If the answer remains no, “it was inherited from the previous government” will cease to be an explanation. It will become a political liability for the government in office.